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Since fossil fuel subsidy reforms can induce signiﬁcant distributional shifts and price shocks, effective
compensation and social protection programs are crucial. Based on the statistical simulation model by
Araar and Verme (2012), this study estimates the regional variability of direct welfare effects of removing
fuel subsidies in Nigeria. Uncompensated subsidy removal is estimated to increase the national poverty
rate by 3–4% on average. However, uniform cash compensation that appears effective at the national
average, is found to fail to mitigate price shocks in 16 of 37 states – thus putting livelihoods (and public
support for reforms) at risk. States that are estimated to incur the largest welfare shocks, coincide with
hotspots of civil unrest following Nigeria's 2012 subsidy reform attempt. The study illustrates how re-
gionally disaggregated compensation can be revenue neutral, and maintain or reduce pre-reform poverty
rates in all states. Overall, it highlights the importance of understanding differences in vulnerability, and
designing tailored social protection schemes which ensure public support for subsidy reforms.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Fossil fuel subsidies have been documented to be highly re-
gressive, as they predominantly beneﬁt the rich, thus having
substantial implications for the distribution of wealth. The reason
is that high-income households consume larger quantities of
subsidised products – energy in particular – thus siphoning off a
disproportionately large share of overall subsidies (Arze del
Granado et al., 2012). As a necessary consequence the removal of
fuel subsidies is also likely to trigger signiﬁcant distributional
impacts and income shocks. If unmitigated, these adverse effects
can be felt across all income groups, with the poorest being par-
ticularly vulnerable.r Ltd. This is an open access article
on, Institute for Sustainable
on, UK.Nigeria's attempted fuel subsidy removal in 2012 illustrates
how the mis-management of such adverse effects can jeopardise
entire reforms: the government’s decision to remove subsidies on
fossil fuel imports caused fuel prices to more than double. Strikes
and violent public protests followed, prompting the government
to immediately reintroduce subsidies (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012;
Siddig et al., 2014). Similarly, governments of Bolivia (2010), Ca-
meroon (2008), Venezuela (1989), and Yemen (2005 and 2014)
were all forced to abandon reform attempts following heavy public
protests, particularly by low-income population groups (IEA, 2014;
Segal, 2011).
These cases conﬁrm that it is critical to understand the in-
cidence of existing subsidy beneﬁts, and the potential welfare
impacts of a reform. Carefully designed compensation measures
are essential for mitigating energy price shocks, ensuring the af-
fordability of fuel, and protecting livelihoods of vulnerable
households (Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 2013). Indeed, severalunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Fossil fuel subsidies in Nigeria: Upper panel: Estimated annual fossil fuel
subsidies, primarily for oil and oil derivatives (millions of Naira). Uncertainty per-
sists over the amount of subsidies paid after a presidential directive in 2009 to
suspend kerosene subsidies. Lower panel: Prices for diesel, petrol and kerosene in
Naira per liter. (IEA, 2014; IMF, 2013).
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timely and credible communication of reform beneﬁts – effective
compensation is crucial for securing public support for reform
(IMF, 2013a; Vagliasindi, 2012).
This paper focuses on Nigeria, and uses the statistical simula-
tion model by Araar and Verme (2012) to estimate the regional
variability of direct welfare effects of removing fuel subsidies. It
ﬁnds that an uncompensated removal of fuel subsidies can in-
crease the national poverty headcount rate by 3–4%. The paper
investigates different compensation strategies and their effect on
poverty rates both at the national and state level.
Crucially, this paper shows that uniform cash compensation
that appears effective when considering national averages, fails to
mitigate price shocks in 16 of 37 states – thus putting livelihoods
at risk, and provoking public opposition. Notably, states identiﬁed
to incur the largest price shocks were hotspots of violent public
protests in 2012. As an alternative, this paper illustrates how a
regionally disaggregated compensation strategy can ensure for all
states that price shocks are mitigated, and poverty rates either
unchanged or lower than before the reform. Overall, the analysis
shows the need for thorough, disaggregated analyses of subsidy
reforms, and tailored reform strategies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
provides more detailed information about Nigeria's fossil fuel
sector and subsidy program. Section 3 presents a disaggregated
analysis of energy consumption patterns in Nigeria to highlight
underlying inequalities. Section 4 presents an empirical subsidy
simulation: Section 4.1 presents the methodology, followed by an
outline of the (hypothetical) reform scenarios in Section 4.2. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the results both at the national level (4.3.1) and
disaggregated to the state-level (4.3.2). Section 5 concludes.2. Fuel subsidies in Nigeria
As a developing country with substantial fossil resource wealth
and a mixed track record of ﬁscal prudence and transparency,
Nigeria is a frequently cited case for studying fossil fuel subsidies
and natural resource management more generally.
Nigeria extracts 2.5 m barrels of oil a day, which account for
70% of government revenues and 95% of total exports (GSI, 2012;
IMF, 2013b). These oil exports make Nigeria the ﬁfth largest oil
exporter in the world. Despite abundant energy resources, only
55% of Nigerians have access to electricity (34% in rural areas);
annual per capita electricity consumption in 2012 was 155 kW h,
compared to 4405 kW h in South Africa (World Bank, 2015). And
electricity supply is not only elusive, but also unreliable: chronic
underinvestment and corruption in the electricity sector mean
that the average Nigerian enterprise experiences over 36 power
outages a month, wiping out 4% of annual GDP. Similar problems
plague the country's four national oil reﬁneries, which operate at
just 20–30% capacity. While over 70% of fuel consumption is met
by imports, shortages are endemic (IMF, 2013a; World Bank, 2015).
Through the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency,
Nigeria maintains artiﬁcially low energy prices – most notably for
kerosene and petrol (GSI, 2012). The gap between fuel import
costs and regulated prices are ﬁnanced through the Petroleum
Support Fund, which administers fuel subsidies.1 Fig. 1 provides
estimates of the overall volume of the subsidy program, as well as
fuel prices per litre; the reliability of these ﬁgures remains1 The Petroleum Support Fund is managed by the Petroleum Products Pricing
Regulatory Agency, and receives a set allocation in the federal budget. Contribu-
tions to the fund are made by the federal, state, and local governments. Moreover,
the fund is supplemented by subsidy “surpluses”, which essentially occur when
international market prices exceed the government-set fuel price (GSI, 2012).uncertain due to conﬂicting information from different national
authorities and large-scale subsidy theft (GSI, 2012; also see Sec-
tion 4.2).2
At nearly 5% of GDP in 2011 subsidies are a signiﬁcant expense
for the government (IMF, 2013a); and fail to reach Nigerians in
more than one sense: As with all fossil fuel subsidy schemes, the
direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts to households are concentrated on the
rich, thus failing to beneﬁt the absolute poor (which constitute
61% of the population).3 In addition, a complex and opaque system
of intermediary dealers and political inﬂuence means that, instead
of lowering the market price, subsidies are often privately appro-
priated before the fuel reaches the market. For kerosene, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the subsidised rate of N50 per litre is in fact
only available to privileged individuals, while regular consumers
often pay prices between N120 and N250 (Udo, 2015). Finally,
rampant fuel smuggling means subsidy beneﬁts are leaking out of
the country. Mlachila et al. (2016) estimate that over 80% of petrol
consumed in Benin in 2011 was smuggled from Nigeria (about 60%
in Togo).
Facing mounting ﬁscal pressures and recognising the in-
efﬁciencies of its subsidy scheme, Nigeria attempted a radical
subsidy reform in 2012. While the need for such reform was
pressing, the government failed to garner sufﬁcient public support
for its reform efforts. Public opposition to the reform had two key
reason in particular: (i) A lack of credibility and transparency with
respect to the handling of reform revenues, and (ii) inadequate
plans for compensation and social protection, resulting from a
poor understanding of the needs and vulnerability of affected
energy consumers. Subsidy removal was met with extensive
strikes and violent public protests, and prompted the government
to swiftly reintroduce subsidies (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012; Siddig
et al., 2014).3. Understanding energy demand
Understanding the patterns of energy consumption is crucial
for understanding who stands to lose most from subsidy removal,
and designing effective social protection schemes. This paper uses
the Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey of 2009/2010,2 For instance, there is conﬂicting information on the amount of subsidies
provided following a 2009 government decision to remove kerosene subsidies (GSI,
2012). The NNPC maintains that N310 bn in subsidies have been paid out, but
disputes between different authorities persist.
3 This ﬁgure is based on the absolute poverty deﬁnition, using an absolute
poverty line of N54,401 (NBS, 2010).
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149,261 individuals) across all 37 federal states (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2013). The survey provides a detailed breakdown of
household expenditure on food, education, health, energy and
other goods.
Especially in countries such as Nigeria, where existing subsidy
schemes are justiﬁed as a mechanism for redistributing natural
resource revenues and for supporting poor households, it is critical
to understand the scale of regressivity. Various studies have
highlighted how energy subsidies fail to reach poor households:
Arze del Granado et al. (2012) analyse a sample of 20 developing
countries from around the world and ﬁnd that on average the
richest 20% beneﬁt six times more from fuel subsidies than the
poorest 20% (in absolute terms). Soile and Mu (2015) conﬁrm si-
milar patterns for Nigeria.
The reason that the rich reap most of the subsidies is simply
that they consume more energy. For instance, considering the
correlation between vehicle ownership and spending on con-
sumption goods, including energy, illustrates that richer house-
holds in Nigeria tend to own more and bigger motorised vehicles,
and thus consume more petrol (Fig. 2).
The level of income inequality in Nigeria is reﬂected in Fig. 3.
Consumption expenditure (which includes food, rent, education,
energy, among others) is a common proxy for income levels, and
indeed varies substantially across income deciles. In per capita
terms, the data suggests that consumption expenditure by the
richest 10% of the population exceeds that of the poorest 10% by a
factor 10. The 2nd and 9th deciles still differ by a factor 4 – and
there is little difference to this pattern between urban and rural
areas.
Considering energy consumption separately, inequality is sig-
niﬁcantly more pronounced than for aggregate consumption
(Fig. 3, right). In urban areas, the richest 10% spend 28 times more
on energy consumption than the poorest 10% (factor 23 in rural
areas). Notably, across the entire income distribution, average
energy expenditure by urban households is consistently higher
than by rural households (despite having the same level of total
expenditure). This may reﬂect a variety of issues, including access
to and availability of energy, and differing economic activities. It
comes as no surprise that fuel subsidies primarily beneﬁt the rich,
and thus directly reinforce existing patterns of inequality and
poverty.
Moreover, regardless of income levels, urban households spend
a larger share of their income on energy than their rural coun-
terparts (Fig. 4). Roughly speaking, most of the urban population
spends around 5% of their income on energy, while rural house-
holds spend around 3%; and in both cases the energy share is
signiﬁcantly larger for the highest income households.Fig. 2. Average household expenditure for all consumption goods (upper panel),
and petrol (lower panel), according to ownership of motorised vehicles (N/month).Note, however, that these ﬁgures only reﬂect direct spending
on energy goods (e.g. fuels and electricity), and do not take into
account the energy cost of other consumption goods. In the
medium to long run, changes in energy prices will indirectly affect
the costs of public transport, manufacturing, distribution of goods,
and other parts of the economy. Moreover, particularly for low-
income households even small amounts of energy can be crucial
for income-generating activities (incl. agriculture), and for ensur-
ing access to services and markets. This means that livelihoods of
the poor are likely to be more strongly affected by energy prices
than the above numbers suggest. For high-income households,
energy consumption is more likely to be “compressible” – i.e. re-
latively more energy (such as transport fuels) is used for non-es-
sential purposes.
To understand this, it is useful to disaggregate consumption
patterns for different forms of energy, which typically serve very
different purposes (Fig. 5). Kerosene, for instance, is a fuel most
commonly used for lighting and cooking – richer households ty-
pically substitute kerosene for cleaner energy, such as electric
light. Moreover, natural constraints (e.g. on the number of meals
prepared per day) mean that kerosene has a lower income elas-
ticity than, for example, petrol which displays the characteristics
of a luxury good. Indeed, petrol consumption is highly “unequal”:
the richest 10% consume 65.8% of all petrol used in urban areas
(29.7% in rural areas), while the poorest 10% consume a mere
0.03% (1.9% in rural areas). In contrast, kerosene consumption is
more evenly distributed.
Across all fuels types, consumption inequality is less pro-
nounced in rural than in urban areas (Fig. 5, left). In terms of
average expenditure, rural households spend less than urban
households, particularly on electricity and kerosene. Again the fact
that total energy consumed in rural areas is considerably less than
in urban areas may reﬂect issues around access and availability.
This difference hints at a more complex underlying pattern,
which the binary rural–urban distinction may not fully capture.
Even at the same income level, regional differences may have a
substantial inﬂuence on energy consumption. Fig. 6 illustrates the
sharp regional differences: for each state, it maps the average
monthly expenditure by poor people (here deﬁned as total con-
sumption expenditure being under N55,000 per year) for energy
overall, petrol, kerosene, and electricity. Expenditure levels differ
signiﬁcantly across states, and across different energy goods. In
general, poor people in the more developed South-West spend
more on energy than those in the North-East, suggesting stronger
reliance on energy products.
The data presented in this section allow for several observa-
tions on energy consumption in Nigeria: (i) Absolute spending on
energy goods is more unequally distributed than overall con-
sumption and income. The highest income decile accounts for
37.5–66% of total expenditure (depending on which energy good is
considered). (ii) Energy expenditure relative to income is in-
creasing with income. Top income households spend the highest
income share on energy. (iii) Roughly speaking, poor people in the
more industrialised Southern states spend signiﬁcantly more on
energy than poor people in Northern states.
It is reasonable to infer that poor households, which are par-
ticularly reliant on energy for their livelihoods (e.g. for income
generating activities), will be especially vulnerable to energy price
shocks. Hence, identifying vulnerable households and assessing
the level of their exposure and vulnerability is necessary for de-
signing adequate compensation and social protection measures.
4. Simulating reform
This section provides the results from a subsidy reform simu-
lation for the case of Nigeria, conducted based on the empirical
Fig. 3. Left panel: Average per capita expenditure on all consumption goods, according to income deciles. Right panel: Average per capita expenditure on energy goods,
according to income deciles. All numbers are in Naira per month.
Fig. 4. Expenditure on energy goods as a share of total consumption expenditure,
according to income deciles.
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this simulation is to get an indication of the magnitude of the
short- to medium-term welfare effects of a subsidy removal, and
understand how these effects may vary across regions.
This simulation only considers the direct welfare effects that
occur when a removal of fuel subsidies increases households’ cost
of maintaining energy consumption. It does not account for further
indirect welfare effects which are bound to occur as rising energy
prices also increase the cost of other consumption goods, such as
food and public transport; accounting for such indirect price ef-
fects requires the analysis of input-output tables, or use of general
equilibrium models. A study by Arze del Granado et al. (2012)
suggests that on average indirect effects make up about 60% of the
total impacts of a subsidy removal.
Araar and Verme (2012) suggest that the omission of indirect
price effects is reasonable if the focus is on short- to medium-term
effects (e.g. up to 2 months) of a subsidy removal. They point out
that analysing direct effects has the advantage of requiring only a
single household expenditure survey, and few ex-ante modelling
assumptions.4 This paper follows this approach and focuses on the
variability of impacts across income groups and federal states.4 Araar et al. (2015) and Verme and El-Massnaoui (2015) both follow this ap-
proach to consider fuel subsidy reforms in Libya and Morocco respectively. See
Siddig et al. (2014) for a CGE analysis.Note that input-output tables are not available at the state-level,
and the generalised use of a national input-output table would
defeat the point of looking beyond national averages.
4.1. Methodology
The underlying methodology for assessing direct welfare ef-
fects of standard fossil fuel subsidy removals is based on Araar and
Verme (2012) who offer a more detailed exposition: expenditure
on aggregate consumption is used as a proxy for a household's
income and thus its level of welfare.5 As subsidies for certain en-
ergy goods are removed, their prices increase. Given the devel-
oping country setting, it is assumed that the majority of house-
holds cannot simply draw on savings to compensate for higher
energy prices. This implies that – at least in the short- to medium-
run – it is reasonable to assume that households’ budgets are
ﬁxed; thus, households can only respond to higher prices by re-
ducing the consumption of the (formerly) subsidised good, or by
substituting it (e.g. for a cheaper type of fuel). Aggregated at the
national level, these effects mean that overall consumption ex-
penditure (i.e. welfare) would fall, and poverty increase.
Formally, the overall change in welfare (ΔW ) due to subsidy
removal can be expressed as
∑ ∑Δ = Δ =− =− Δ
( )= =
W C c dp c
p
p 1i
N
g i g
i
N
g i
g
g1
,
0
1
,
0
0
where cg i,
0 denotes consumption expenditure for subsidised good g
by household i before the reform (i.e. =t 0). N denotes the overall
number of households in a country or state, and Δpg the absolute
price change (i.e. Δ = −p p pg g g
0 1). This implies that irrespective of
whether and how households substitute away from the subsidised
good, the real decrease in welfare is equivalent to the relative
change of the cost of pre-reform consumption of the subsidised
good.
In other words, the countrywide welfare effect of a subsidy
reform depends on two main factors, which can differ across re-
gions, and thus necessitate different compensation measures:
 Pre-reform consumption of the subsidised good ( cg0): In absolute
terms, the more a household consumes of the subsidised good,
the higher the absolute welfare effects of reform. Likewise,5 For the purpose of household survey analyses consumption based welfare
measures are the most common approach; see Deaton (2003).
Fig. 5. Different fuels, different usage patterns: Left: Share in total expenditure, according to income deciles and different fuels. Right: Average monthly per capita spending
on different fuels, according to income deciles.
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good in total consumption expenditure (c c/g
0 0); i.e. the more a
household spends on the subsidised good relative to income,
the more it is “exposed” to the welfare effects due to the re-
moval of subsidies.
 Relative price change due to subsidy removal (dpg): The extent to
which a subsidy reform affects household consumption and
welfare depends on the extent to which prices increase. In
principle, if the level of subsidy is known (e.g. in terms of $/litre
of petrol), the price change due to subsidy removal is straight-
forward to establish. In practice, as in the Nigerian example,
ofﬁcial government-set prices may vary substantially from ac-
tual prices in the market place, due to issues such as mis-
appropriation of subsidy funds, corruption, and ineffective dis-
tribution. This issue is difﬁcult to quantify, and remains an un-
certainty throughout the analysis.
In line with Eq. (2), which shows the post-reform decrease in
overall spending or welfare, the absolute change in consumption
of the subsidised good can be expressed as
∑Δ = ϵ
( )=
C c dp .
2
g
i
N
g i g i g
1
, ,
0
The price elasticity of demand εg i, reﬂects that households may
adjust their consumption of the subsidised good in response tochanging prices. Note that the elasticity is given by the ratio of the
relative changes in consumed quantity and price:
ϵ =
Δ
Δ ( )
q q
p p
/
/ 3
g i
g i g i
g g
,
, ,
0
0
Note that inelastic demand ( ε =0g ) would imply that subsidy
removal does not cause households to adjust the consumed
quantity of the subsidised good (yet, a ﬁxed budget constraint
means that consumption of other goods is reduced). In practice
this could, for instance, be the case if the subsidised fuel is critical
for income generating activities, and no alternative fuels are
available. On the other hand, fully price elastic demand (ε = − 1g )
would imply that households reduce consumption of the sub-
sidised good at the same rate with which prices were increased.
In addition to investigating aggregate consumption and wel-
fare, it is possible to make a simple approximation of a govern-
ment's reform revenue. In the formal setting introduced above, the
additional revenue for a government that results from the removal
of fuel subsidies can be expressed as
( )( )∑Δ = +ϵ + ( )=R c dp dp1 1 . 4s i
N
g i g g i g
1
,
0
,
This expression implies that reform revenue is equivalent to the
nominal aggregate change in households’ consumption
Fig. 6. These maps display the average monthly per capita spending on energy by all Nigerians living below the absolute poverty line (here deﬁned as total consumption
expenditure below 55,000 Naira per year, which roughly corresponds to $1 per day in 2010). All numbers are in Naira per month.
J. Rentschler / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 491–503496expenditure on the subsidised good; or in other words, the
households’ loss (in terms of reduced consumption) is the gov-
ernments gain (i.e. avoided payment of subsidies). Note that for
the purpose of this paper, overall reform revenue is the sum of
revenues from subnational states s, such that ΔΔ = ∑ =R Rs
S
s1 .
4.2. A hypothetical fuel subsidy reform
This section brieﬂy sets out the main features of a hypothetical
fossil fuel subsidy reform:
4.2.1. Elasticities
There are few robust estimates for price elasticities of different
fossil fuels in Nigeria. The analysis is complicated by highly dis-
torted and manipulated markets, signiﬁcant supply shortages and
access barriers (Iwayemi et al., 2010). Omisakin et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that energy demand in Nigeria is relatively inelastic: long-run
price elasticities are estimated to be 0.016 for petrol and 0.205
for kerosene. Iwayemi et al. (2010) use cointegration regressions to
estimate statistically signiﬁcant long-run price elasticities of –0.115
for kerosene, and –0.106 for aggregate energy products (i.e. petrol,
diesel and kerosene). In the short-run, they estimate price elasti-
cities to be –0.415 for diesel, and –0.249 for petrol.In a survey of 18 developing countries Dahl (1994) suggests
that short- run price elasticities for oil demand tend to be clus-
tered between –0.05 and –0.09, while long-run elasticities are as
low as –0.3. These ﬁgures are in line with a more recent study:
Arzaghi and Squalli (2015) estimate elasticities for petrol demand
in 32 fuel-subsidizing economies. They ﬁnd short- and long-run
price elasticities to be around –0.05 and –0.25 respectively.
For the purpose of this paper a price elasticity of –0.3 is used for
all energy products. For comparison, Verme and El-Massnaoui
(2015) conduct a subsidy reform analysis for Morocco, and use a
price elasticity of –0.2 for all energy products. Araar et al. (2015)
conduct a similar study for Libya, and apply a price elasticity of –
0.5 for all energy products. It should be noted that the choice of
elasticity plays an important role in estimating the post-reform
level of energy consumption. However, estimates of overall wel-
fare impacts do not depend on elasticities, as illustrated by Eq. (1).
4.2.2. Energy goods and subsidies
Subsidies on petrol, kerosene, and electricity are considered.
These three energy types represent over 80% of total energy con-
sumption (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). In the case of Ni-
geria, obtaining reliable ﬁgures on consumer subsidies for these
energy goods is remarkably difﬁcult. Large-scale smuggling, black
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mean that market prices can be signiﬁcantly higher than those
prescribed (and paid for) by the government.
It is also unclear how large overall subsidy payments have been
(both in terms of subsidy per litre, and at the national level). For
instance, while the government ofﬁcially suspended kerosene
subsidies in 2009, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) which administers kerosene subsidies, claims arrears of
N310 bn. But it remains unclear whether or to what extent this
sum was actually disbursed as subsidies. Moreover, frequently
changing policies, contradicting information and data, and opaque
institutions increase the margin of error. The GSI (2012) and (IMF,
2013b) provide detailed accounts of energy subsidies in Nigeria,
and provide the basis for the numbers used in this study.
 Petrol: The subsidised retail price is assumed to be N65 per litre
for 2010 (corresponding to the year of the household survey).
Subsidies are assumed to be N90 per litre.
 Kerosene: While the government prescribes a price of N50 per
litre, the actual retail price is often signiﬁcantly higher. Mid-
dlemen siphon off around N108 per litre. For this study an
average retail price of N100 per litre is assumed, and subsidy
removal is assumed to be uniformly passed on to end-users.
 Electricity usage varies distinctly across different regions. The
pre-reform effective electricity tariff of N7/kW h is used as a
baseline. As production costs are estimated to be around N23/
kW h, this implies an electricity subsidy of N16/kW h.
Fig. 7 illustrates the regressivity of the above deﬁned subsidy
levels for petrol, kerosene and electricity. Beneﬁts from electricity
and kerosene subsidies can be seen to be concentrated dis-
proportionately on the rich, following a similar distribution as
overall income (see Lorenz curve for consumption as reference).
Beneﬁts from petrol subsidies are signiﬁcantly more concentrated
on the rich than beneﬁts from electricity and kerosene. Note that
this pattern results directly from the starkly unequal distribution
of energy consumption (Fig. 5).0 
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Fig. 7. Regressivity of subsidy beneﬁts: Subsidies predominantly beneﬁt higher
income households. Subsidies on petrol are the most regressive.4.2.3. Compensation and social protection
For this study, a scheme is considered which mitigates adverse
effects on households by directly compensating income shocks.
This compensation mechanism takes the form of a universal,
uniform and untargeted cash transfer scheme. ‘Uniform’ cash
payments imply that regardless of location or income, the same
lump sum payment is made per person.
In practice, uniform and universal cash transfer schemes do not
require costly and administratively complicated targeting of ben-
eﬁciaries; this makes them particularly relevant in policy en-
vironments with low administrative capacity and limited pre-ex-
isting social safety net infrastructure. By assuming that compen-
sation payments are made universally, this study estimates an
upper bound compensation costs. Targeting compensation pay-
ments to only the most vulnerable, rather than the entire popu-
lation is likely to be cheaper, especially when existing social pro-
tection infrastructure can be used to keep targeting costs low. In
Nigeria, no strong social protection system exists with country-
wide coverage.
Two reform scenarios are considered. In both scenarios it is as-
sumed that a subsidy reduction will cause a uniform energy price
increase throughout the country. (i) In the ﬁrst scenario subsidies
are reduced by 50% on all three considered energy goods. This
implies price increases of 69% for petrol, 108% for kerosene, and
114% for electricity. (ii) The second case represents complete
subsidy removal, i.e. a reduction by 100%. This implies price in-
creases of 138% (petrol), 216% (kerosene), and 228% (electricity).
While a 100% reduction appears radical – especially considering
the high subsidisation rate – this corresponds to what the Nigerian
government attempted to implement in 2009 (kerosene) and 2012
(petrol), and again announced for 2016.
4.2.4. Poverty line
The deﬁnition of the poverty line can make a signiﬁcant dif-
ference to the estimates. In this study, total consumption ex-
penditure of N55,000 per year or less is used for deﬁning absolute
poverty (this roughly corresponds to $1 per day in 2010).
4.3. Estimation results: the impacts of reform
4.3.1. Impacts at the national level
The extent to which subsidy removal increases poverty rates
differs across energy goods (Fig. 8). Increases in kerosene prices0
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Fig. 8. Uncompensated price increases push up poverty levels: These lines re-
present the impact on poverty for each energy good separately (i.e. they are not
stacked). A 100% subsidy removal corresponds to a 228% increase of electricity
prices, 216% for kerosene, and 138% for petrol. Further price increases correspond to
energy taxes.
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However, note that poverty rates only capture part of the picture.
Energy price shocks adversely affect households at all income le-
vels. Already poor households are pushed deeper into poverty, and
previously non-poor households may be pushed close to the
poverty line.
In the absence of any compensation a 100% (or 50%) reduction
of subsidies is estimated to instantly increase the poverty head-
count rate from pre-reform 60–63.3% (or 61.8%) (Fig. 9); while the
poverty gap increases from 25.7% to 27.8%. It comes as no surprise
that any uncompensated subsidy reform tends to be met by strong
public opposition. The ﬁgure illustrates further that by providing a
universal (i.e. untargeted) and uniform cash transfer, the govern-
ment can mitigate the increase of poverty—and above a certain
level even offset and reverse it. In comparison – using the same
methodology – Araar et al. (2015) estimate that full removal of
energy subsidies in Libya would increase energy prices by 670%
and more than double the pre-reform poverty rate of 8.5%.
Arguably the most important question for a household is how
the proposed subsidy reform impacts on welfare. This impact is
determined by several factors, including (i) the extent to which
subsidies are reduced (i.e. magnitude of the price shock), (ii) the
pre-reform level of income and energy expenditure (i.e. vulner-
ability and exposure to the shock), (iii) the level of cash compen-
sation received (i.e. government support for coping with the
shock).
Fig. 10 shows for all income groups that compensatory cash
transfers – depending on their level – can mitigate or even offset
consumption shocks. For all income deciles a cash transfer level
can be determined which exactly offsets the consumption shock
due to subsidy removal. Moreover, in both reform scenarios, a
threshold for cash compensation is determined that ensures net
poverty neutrality of the reform (blue dashed line); i.e. the na-
tional poverty rate does not increase due to the reform, if this
lump sum compensation is transferred uniformly to each person.
Note that these cash transfer levels mean that roughly the poorest
60% of the population are better off after the reform.
In the case of a 100% removal of existing subsidies on petrol,
kerosene and electricity, the government can raise N54 bn in gross
revenues. With a population of approximately 163 million, this
implies that a uniform and universal cash transfer of N331 can be
provided. This redistribution of reform revenues would instantly
reduce the national poverty rate by about 1% compared to pre-
reform levels. Moreover, if compensation is directly targeted to
poor households (rather than provided universally), and if55 
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Fig. 9. Cash transfers can mitigate a rise in poverty: Left: In the case of a complete rem
necessary to avoid a post-reform increase in poverty (relative to the pre-reform poverty
transfer of about N161 is needed to prevent a rise in post-reform poverty.additional funds are used, cash transfers may deliver more sig-
niﬁcant poverty reductions than in Fig. 10. Note that these ﬁgures
ignore potential transaction costs of cash transfers, but these tend
to be lower than those associated with subsidies, which are prone
to corruption and graft.
The potential revenues from subsidy removal depend on the
overall demand for an energy good, and the associated pre-reform
total subsidy payments. This is illustrated by Fig. 11 (left panel),
which reﬂects that the average Nigerian household spends more on
kerosene than on petrol, and more on petrol than on electricity.
Removing kerosene subsidies will thus yield the highest gross re-
form revenues – but reducing kerosene subsidies is also associated
with the highest rate of poverty increase (Fig. 9), thus requiring
larger cash transfers to compensate vulnerable households.
In practice, particularly in developing countries, subsidy re-
movals without compensation are politically unviable, as price
shocks have signiﬁcant impacts on the welfare of a majority of the
population. Thus, ultimately, any statement on reform revenues
must account for the cost of compensation. Fig. 12 shows the es-
timated net government revenues for both reform scenarios, with
respect to the level of the per capita compensatory cash transfer.
When subsidy removal is made poverty neutral through cash
transfers, net revenues are N4.7 bn in the case of a 100% subsidy
reduction, and N7 bn for a 50% reduction. In the absence of any
compensation, revenues are N54 bn (100%) and N33.3 bn (50%).
These government revenue ﬁgures refer to “avoided” monthly
subsidy payments which the government can realise immediately
after a reform. In practice, case studies of past subsidy reforms
show that compensatory cash transfers do not tend to be provided
indeﬁnitely, but are complemented with (potentially revenue
generating) public investments, e.g. in infrastructure. Thus, mea-
suring reform revenues in the long term is more complex than for
the short-term, and depends greatly on redistribution and re-
investment decisions.
In countries such as Nigeria, where fossil fuel subsidies are ﬁ-
nanced through resource rents, the redistribution and reinvest-
ment of reform revenues is closely linked to the management of
natural resource revenues. A large literature exists which discusses
different approaches to sustainable resource management, which
in many cases calls for capital and infrastructure investments
which help to diversify income streams (Gill et al., 2014). Notably,
a series of studies have also explored and advocated the im-
plementation of a resource dividend, in the form of a permanent
uniform cash transfer (Devarajan et al., 2011; Moss and Young,
2009; Segal, 2011; Standing, 2014). This would essentially55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
0 100 200 300 400 500
Cash transfer (N per person)
50% subsidy 
reduction
Poverty neutral 
transfer (N161) 
Revenue neutral 
transfer (N204) 
Pre-reform poverty 
level (60%) 
oval of fuel subsidies (scenario R100) a monthly cash transfer of at least N302 is
level of 60%). Right: For a 50% reduction in subsidies (scenario R50) a monthly cash
-1000 
-500 
0 
500 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (i
n 
N
) 
Level of cash transfer (N per person)
10
Poverty neutral 
transfer (N302) 
9
8
7
6
5
4
1
…
Revenue neutral 
transfer (N331) 
100% subsidy 
reduction
0 200 300 400 500100
-1000
-500
0
500
0 200 300 400 500
Level of cash transfer (N per person)
Poverty neutral 
transfer (N161) 
Revenue neutral 
transfer (N204) 
10
9
8
7
…
100
1
50% subsidy 
reduction
Fig. 10. Compensation makes the difference: The solid lines reﬂect the ten income deciles; the blue dashed line indicates the minimum cash transfer required to prevent an
increase of the national poverty rate. Left: Scenario with 100% reduction of electricity, petrol and kerosene subsidies. Right: Scenario with 50% reduction in subsidies.
Fig. 11. Left: Government revenues from reducing fossil fuel subsidies depend on the speciﬁc energy good. Note that these lines are not stacked; they do not account for the
cost of compensatory cash transfers. Right: The sensitivity of government revenue from a 50% subsidy reduction to variation in the price elasticity of energy consumption.
(Note that elasticities do not inﬂuence government revenues in the case of full subsidy removal.)
-60 
-50 
-40 
-30 
-20 
-10 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 g
ov
. r
ev
en
ue
 (b
n 
N
) 
0 100 200 300 400 500
Cash transfer (N per person)
Poverty neutral 
transfer (N161)
Poverty neutral 
transfer (N302)
Fig. 12. Change in government revenues: Reform revenues and compensatory cash
transfers: For each case, the dotted lines indicate the minimum universal cash transfer
necessary to avoid an increase in poverty, and the associated government revenue.
J. Rentschler / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 491–503 499institutionalise the short-term cash compensation suggested in
this section, as a direct and long-term measure for reducing pov-
erty and increasing welfare.
4.3.2. Disaggregating impacts to the state level
Like most previous studies on the impacts of subsidy removal,
the analysis in section 4.3.1 has focused on national averages.
However, vulnerability to price shocks is highly context speciﬁc
and a compensation policy based on national averages is likely to
be inadequate for certain population groups. The maps in Fig. 13
illustrate one dimension of state-level differences by displaying
two measures of poverty, as measured by the household ex-
penditure survey. As headcount rates of absolute poverty vary
between 25% and 88%, the consequences of subsidy removal and
energy price shocks are bound to differ.
To complement studies at the national level, this section dis-
aggregates the estimates to each of Nigeria's 37 federal states. This
section considers different compensation strategies, and analyses
how they may affect poverty levels across states. In particular, the
purpose of this section is to show that the effects of subsidy re-
moval differ signiﬁcantly across states, and illustrate to what
Fig. 13. Pre-reform poverty: Left: Headcount rates of people living in absolute poverty in each state, as observed in the household expenditure survey. Right: Poverty gap
measure for each state, indicating the severity of poverty of people living below the absolute poverty line.
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compensate some, while undercompensating others.
The compensation strategies considered in this section are cho-
sen for illustrative purposes, and are uniform at the state-level (i.e.
within states, cash transfers are assumed to be of equal size, and
provided to everyone). In practice, if large-scale social safety nets
and poverty registers are available, these are likely to allow more
efﬁcient targeting of vulnerable households. Existing social protec-
tion channels can be used to identify and support those who are
worst hit. If safety nets lack coverage or simply do not exist – as in
the case of Nigeria – identifying and targeting vulnerable households
may prove to be expensive and slow. For simplicity, only the sce-
nario of 100% subsidy removal is considered in this section.
4.3.3. Uncompensated subsidy removal
Relative to pre-reform levels of poverty, full removal of fossil
fuel subsidies is estimated to increase poverty rates most in the
more developed states of Southern Nigeria. Low pre-reform pov-
erty rates suggest a large group of near-poor households, who are
pushed into poverty through the reform induced energy priceFig. 14. Poverty increases in the absence of compensation or social protection: Left: Estim
gap of respective states. (For interpretation of colors in the ﬁgure legends, the reader isshock. This effect is exacerbated as poor and near-poor households
in these states tend to rely on energy subsidies more heavily than
households of similar income levels in the North.
Poverty rates in northern states are estimated to increase less
drastically. However, this must not be interpreted in the sense that
subsidy removal has little impact in these states. With pre-reform
poverty rates of 70–90%, there is less scope for the number of
people in absolute poverty to increase. But the severity of poverty
of those who are already poor is likely to be aggravated (Fig. 14).
The attempted removal of fossil fuel subsidies in Nigeria in
2012 was accompanied by the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empow-
erment Program which was to feature a range of infrastructure
investments (especially in the power, transportation, water and
downstream petroleum sectors), as well as social safety nets (IMF,
2013a). However, the announcement of these vague plans for
compensation and reinvestment came late, and their im-
plementation even more so. Large parts of the population ex-
pected reform revenues to ﬂow into wasteful government
spending or feed corruption. Thus the reality, or the public's per-
ception of it, resembled the uncompensated subsidy removalated increases in poverty headcount rates. Right: Estimated increases in the poverty
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 15. Post-reform poverty rates without compensation: a 100% reduction of
subsidies increases poverty headcount rates in all states. States with lower pre-
reform poverty rates tend to have larger increases in poverty.
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subsidies, with particularly severe unrest occurring in me-
tropolitan regions in the South (dark red in Fig. 14).
Fig. 15 highlights that the largest increases in poverty rates are
estimated to occur in some of the urbanised and most populous
states, including Oyo, Anambra and Lagos. While these are among
the more developed states, with lower poverty rates, they are of
high political importance. This illustrates the two – possibly
competing – needs of a successful subsidy reform: Managing po-
litical economy challenges by ensuring adequate compensation in
richer states; as well as social protection, equitable redistribution
of funds, and poverty alleviation in poorer states.
4.3.4. Poverty neutral compensation
In the previous section, it was estimated that providing na-
tionwide universal cash compensation of N302 could neutralise
the increase in poverty that an uncompensated reform would
cause. According to the estimates, this would indeed hold at the
national average; however, the state level analysis suggests that
the N302 cash transfer is likely to undercompensate in some states
while overcompensating in others. In other words, the level of
cash compensation that maintains poverty neutrality at the na-
tional level, does not actually achieve this objective in any speciﬁc
state (Fig. 16). While some states beneﬁt from poverty reductions
of up to 4%, cash transfers of N302 still leave poverty rates spikingFig. 16. Paying a compensation of N302 to every Nigerian can neutralise a poverty
increase at the national average. At the state level however, this cash transfer level
causes poverty reductions in some states, while failing to mitigate poverty in-
creases in others.by up to 5% in other states. Notably this includes states such Lagos
and Abuja, which experienced intense public opposition to subsidy
reforms in 2012.
As energy consumption patterns differ across states, so does
the level of cash compensation that is needed to maintain poverty
neutrality of a given subsidy removal. Fig. 17 (right) shows the
minimum cash compensation transfer that is required in each
state. Note that, as shown in Fig. 8, this estimated cash transfer
threshold will prevent an increase in the state's average poverty
rate; low income households are still likely to beneﬁt overall from
the reform, while high-income households are likely to lose from
the reform. This emphasises that fossil fuel subsidy reform, paired
with uniform cash transfers, can be a pro-poor progressive ﬁscal
reform.
Overall, ensuring poverty neutrality is a minimum requirement
for protecting the livelihoods of the poorest, and for ensuring
broad public support for subsidy reforms. As Nigeria's 2012 ex-
perience illustrates, failing to communicate and deliver direct
compensation can lead to the downfall of the entire reform
endeavour.
However, if the government's goal is to maximise the devel-
opment potential of a subsidy reform, poverty neutral cash com-
pensation are not sufﬁcient. Poverty neutral cash transfers that are
only provided in the short term can mitigate adverse effects for
poor households, but further complementary policies are critical
to ensure that subsidy reforms actively beneﬁt the poor and are
invested in the foundations for future development.
One of the main concerns raised by poverty neutral cash
transfers is the unequal distribution of compensation (and thus
reform) beneﬁts. States with higher energy consumption and
lower pre-reform poverty rates require higher compensation
payments. Consequently, states with lower pre-reform poverty
rates receive a larger share of the overall compensation budget.
Fig. 18 shows how the overall compensation budget – which de-
pends on per capita transfer levels and a state's population size – is
distributed.
4.3.5. Revenue neutral compensation: a tailored approach
Besides poverty neutral compensation, it is also worth con-
sidering the effect of a revenue neutral compensation scheme. In
this scenario, reform revenues are distributed entirely in the form
of universal cash transfers. In resource rich countries fossil fuel
subsidies are typically ﬁnanced through resource rents; thus
subsidy removal unlocks a continuous revenue stream – rather
than simply reducing government expenditure or yielding a one-
off windfall. By fully dedicating this revenue stream to compen-
sation in the short-term, governments can not only mitigate ad-
verse effects, but also deliver immediate and tangible beneﬁts to
the population and secure broad public support. In the medium-
to long-term, governments can then shift their priority from
compensation to reinvestment and more targeted social safety
nets.
A uniform revenue neutral compensation scheme would re-
distribute the entire reform revenue of N54 bn at N331 per month
to all Nigerians. Such an approach would reduce the national
poverty rate by about 1%. This average however conceals sig-
niﬁcant variation at the state-level (very similar to the poverty
neutral scheme, Fig. 16). Most notably the capital Abuja and Lagos,
would still experience signiﬁcant income shocks and thus in-
creases in their respective poverty rates.
Thus, lastly, another hypothetical and revenue neutral com-
pensation scheme is considered: Poverty neutral compensation is
provided in states where revenue neutral compensation alone
would not prevent increasing poverty rates. The remaining reform
revenue (N31.2 bn) is redistributed at N253 per person in all other
states. This compensation scheme maintains revenue neutrality
Fig. 17. Left: Change in poverty rates after a universal “poverty neutral” compensation payment of N302 per person. While keeping the national poverty level constant,
changes in poverty rates can be signiﬁcant at the state level. Right: Estimated cash transfer levels that neutralise post-reform poverty increases in each state.
Fig. 18. Locating the compensation budget: This ﬁgure shows the overall budget
requirement in each state for implementing a state-level uniform cash transfers
scheme that maintains existing poverty rates.
Fig. 19. The poverty impacts of a tailored compensation scheme: Poverty neutral
compensation is provided in states where revenue neutral compensation alone
would not prevent increasing poverty rates. The remaining reform revenue is re-
distributed at N253 per person in other states.
Fig. 20. Combined poverty and revenue neutral compensation: This map depicts
impact of a combined compensation program on state level poverty rates.
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in poverty rates are avoided in all states, while a series of poorer
states beneﬁt from poverty rate reductions of up to 3% (Fig. 19).
Fig. 20 shows that this combined compensation scheme canprevent poverty increases in richer states in the south, thus
helping to secure public support for reforms in this region. At the
same time, Northern states beneﬁt from reduced poverty rates,
and higher transfers of wealth than in the purely poverty neutral
case.
It should be emphasised that the compensation strategies
considered in this section are hypothetical and stylised. They
mainly serve the purpose of highlighting the important differences
at the subnational level. Taking these into account may help to
design more effective and equitable subsidy reforms.5. Conclusion and policy implications
The inclusion of fossil fuel subsidy reform in the UN's Sus-
tainable Development Goals reﬂects a widespread consensus on
the notion that fossil fuel subsidies are fundamentally unsustain-
able. Indeed, primarily driven by ﬁscal imbalances, in recent years
several countries have made signiﬁcant progress in phasing out
fuel subsidies. And considering the wide range of adverse effects of
fossil fuel subsidies – including market distortions,
J. Rentschler / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 491–503 503underinvestment in infrastructure and efﬁciency, escalating ﬁscal
burdens, climate change, and income inequality – the need for
such reforms is ever increasing. However, the possibility of major
price shocks and adverse distributional effects requires policy
makers to carefully design effective social protection measures.
This paper focuses on Nigeria, and investigates the regional
variability of the direct welfare effects of fuel subsidies removal. It
analyses the role of different cash compensation strategies and
investigates their effect on national and state-level poverty rates.
Overall, the analysis in this paper highlights several issues:
 Inequality: Energy consumption is highly unequal; rich house-
holds account for a disproportionately high share of total energy
expenditure. The level of consumption inequality varies for
different fuel types, with petrol being most and kerosene least
unequal.
 Regressivity: Consumption inequality is the reason for the high
level of regressivity of fuel subsidies; i.e. subsidies pre-
dominantly beneﬁt the rich. Nevertheless, removing fossil fuel
subsidies can have severe effects on the livelihoods of poor
people. These results are in line with ﬁndings from similar
studies e.g. for Morocco, Libya, and Jordan, and also reﬂect the
insights from cross-country studies (Arze del Granado et al.,
2012; Verme and El-Massnaoui, 2015).
 Compensation is key: the analysis shows that compensation
measures play a central role in mitigating energy price shocks
and thus ensuring affordability and protecting livelihoods. For
instance, a countrywide universal (i.e. untargeted) cash com-
pensation program can prevent increases in poverty rates, while
still unlocking signiﬁcant net reform revenues. Redistributing
all reform revenues in the form of cash transfers can sig-
niﬁcantly increase welfare levels throughout the country.
 Seeing beyond national averages: The analysis also shows that
due to varying energy consumption patterns, poverty impacts
and vulnerabilities can vary substantially across geographic re-
gions. Income levels alone may be incomplete indicators of
vulnerability to energy price shocks. By considering national
averages alone, policy makers may fail to recognise certain high
vulnerability groups. For instance, certain compensation mea-
sures (e.g. uniform cash compensation) that appear effective
when considering national averages can still fail to adequately
mitigate price shocks in several states, risking strong public
opposition and shocks to livelihoods.
 The need for tailored strategies: this paper proposes a tailored
compensation strategy which can help to offset the largest
poverty increases in high income states, while contributing to
active poverty reduction in low-income states. This highlights
that there can be a trade-off between mitigating public oppo-
sition to reform, and pro-poor wealth transfers. Balancing these
requirements and priorities calls for careful analysis and tai-
lored reform design.
The practicality and effectiveness of compensation and social
protection programs will depend greatly on country-speciﬁc
characteristics: The availability of pre-existing social safety nets,
poverty registers, and access to reliable infrastructure (incl. mobile
phones, bank accounts, unique ID) as well as alternative energy
forms are critical factors to be considered when designing reforms.
The analysis in this paper aims to contribute to developing a more
reﬁned understanding of the impacts of subsidy reforms and show
the need for a thorough, disaggregated analysis of subsidy reforms,
and tailored reform strategies.Acknowledgements
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